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INTRODUCTION
Cameras are everywhere. From private security footage to
homeland security surveillance to the photographic mapping of
the streets of the world, people today are under constant scrutiny while in the public sphere.1 This phenomenon raises numerous legal questions, but possibly most problematic is the
† B.A Northeastern University, 2014; J.D. Candidate, Cornell Law School,
2017; Articles Editor, Cornell Law Review, Volume 102; Executive Bench Editor,
Cornell Law School Moot Court Board, 2016–17. I would like to thank Professor
Tebbe for helping me get started on this Note, Professor Grimmelmann for helping
me improve the final product, the Cornell Law Review Notes and Publishing
Offices for polishing it for publication, and the numerous 2L associates who
suffered through the minutiae. Further thanks go to my parents for getting me
this far and to my late grandparents, Leo and Margaret Jacques, for taking such a
special interest in my education.
1
See generally Seth F. Kreimer, Pervasive Image Capture and the First
Amendment: Memory, Discourse, and the Right to Record, 159 U. PA. L. REV. 335,
337–45 (2011) (surveying the legal challenges posed by mass image capture).
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ubiquity of camera phones; today everyone has the ability to
instantaneously create a video and spread it across the world.2
The enormity of this power at first glance seems to beg for legal
regulation, but the nature of the issue cautions against it.
Videos, after all, are just a medium of expression. And liberal
democracy places a premium on freedom of expression, often to
the detriment of other rights.3
A video that a woman uploaded to Facebook in October
2015 highlights the complexity of this issue.4 The subject of
the video is a man who the woman alleges was filming her and
some other women on a Boston street without their consent.
The woman took offense and, in the spirit of vigilante justice,
she turned the table on the man and confronted him with her
own camera. In the video, the woman and the man both accuse
each other of legal wrongdoing by filming the other without
permission.5 The woman turned her video over to the police,
but the police declined to investigate because there was no
evidence the man had committed a crime.6 Ironically though,
the woman very well might have. Massachusetts’ wiretapping
law criminalizes the recording of any speech without the
speaker’s consent (subject to certain exceptions that do not
apply here).7 Unsympathetic police officers could well have
investigated the woman for filming the video that she readily
turned over as evidence, an unsympathetic prosecutor could
have charged her with wiretapping, an unsympathetic jury
could have convicted her, and an unsympathetic judge could
have sentenced her to up to five years in prison.8
This prospect is intuitively troublesome. Although some
may disagree with the woman’s tactics, she does not appear to
2
In 2012 there were more than 4.4 billion camera phones in the world. Felix
Richter, 4.4. Billion Camera Phones . . ., STATISTA (Oct. 13, 2012), https://www
.statista.com/chart/653/prevalence-of-selected-features-in-the-global-installedbase-of-mobile-phones/ [https://perma.cc/LR32-AA75].
3
See U.S. CONST. amend. I; OWEN M. FISS, THE IRONY OF FREE SPEECH 3 (1996)
(explaining that free speech is vital for collective self-determination, even at the
expense of other rights).
4
Jase Dillan, FACEBOOK (Oct. 29, 2015), https://www.facebook.com/boston
sara/videos/10102165415247387/ [https://perma.cc/AZ27-57CM].
5
See id.
6
Rossalyn Warren, A Woman Confronted a Man She Claims was Secretly
Filming Her in Public, BUZZFEED (Nov. 2, 2015, 11:04 AM), http://www.buzzfeed
.com/rossalynwarren/a-woman-confronted-a-man-she-claims-was-secretly-filming-wom#.wtpPxja [https://perma.cc/Z9ZE-YCNS].
7
MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 272, § 99(B)(2), (C)(1) (2010). The issue with the
woman’s video is that it captured the man speaking. If the video the man allegedly
took captured the woman or others speaking he may have been likewise liable.
8
See id.
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be the original aggressor in the situation. She perceived an
injustice and used a modern medium—the cellphone video—to
expose this injustice, express her displeasure, and contribute
to a broader conversation about the harassment of women. If
she had penned a letter to the editor about this incident (assuming her allegations were based in truth), her speech would
have invoked the core of the First Amendment. So can it possibly be that the First Amendment would remain silent were this
woman imprisoned for making this video? Recent developments in the federal courts of appeals suggest it would not.
Three circuit courts have held that the First Amendment
protects citizens’ right to record police officers performing their
duties in public without the officer’s consent.9 Although the
courts limited these holdings to this narrow circumstance, they
have not articulated any principle that would prevent further
expansion of the holdings. This naturally raises the question of
whether this burgeoning right to record10 extends beyond the
nonconsensual recording of police officers. And if it does extend beyond this narrow circumstance, where does it end?
Does the right to record protect the woman in the video discussed above? What about the man whom she accused of surreptitiously recording her and other women? This Note seeks
to develop a framework for the right to record that can begin to
answer these and other questions.
These recent cases base the right to record on the established principle that the First Amendment not only protects the
right to disseminate information but also the right to seek out
and collect information. The Supreme Court and lower courts
have developed this First Amendment right to gather information11 in a patchwork of cases over the past forty years, but the
Court has never explained its exact origins or rationale.12 In
9
See ACLU of Illinois v. Alvarez, 679 F.3d 583 (7th Cir. 2012); Glik v. Cunniffe, 655 F.3d 78 (1st Cir. 2011); Smith v. City of Cumming, 212 F.3d 1332, 1332
(11th Cir. 2000).
10
This Note defines the right to record as the right to use technology to
capture one’s auditory and/or visual impression without the subject’s consent.
Although this Note frequently discusses the right to record in terms of videography, it extends equally to still photography and purely audio recordings as
well.
11
The “right to gather information” is often referred to as the “newsgathering
right.” For the purposes of this Note, I will refer to this right as the “right to gather
information” because the formulation “newsgathering right” implies the right only
protects gathering information of some public interest or import. As discussed
infra subpart I.A, this is not necessarily the case.
12
See infra subpart I.A. See generally Barry P. McDonald, The First Amendment and the Free Flow of Information: Towards a Realistic Right to Gather Information in the Information Age, 65 OHIO ST. L.J. 249, 273–302 (2004) (providing an
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order to delineate the boundaries of the right to record, this
Note seeks to identify the theoretical basis of the Court’s right
to gather information doctrine.13 This Note examines the right
to gather information as a democratic right and as a liberal
right—based on two of the most common justifications for protecting free speech—and determines that Supreme Court precedent is more consistent with a liberal view of the right to
gather information.14 As such, this Note concludes that the
right to record is personal to the videographer and is not dependent on the purpose or subject matter of the recording, or
the importance of the recording to the public at large. Thus,
the right to record applies to any circumstance in which the
videographer can readily see and hear the recording’s subject
from somewhere the videographer has a right to be and in
which the subject does not have a reasonable expectation of
privacy.15
This Note begins in Part I with an overview of the case law
establishing the right to gather information and the recent circuit court cases recognizing a right to record police officers
without their consent. Part II then presents a brief overview of
the democratic and liberal free-speech theories. Part III proceeds by analyzing the case law on the right to gather information against both theories and concludes that Supreme Court
precedent on the matter is most consistent with a right to
gather information based on a liberal theory of free speech.
Part IV discusses the implications of a liberal right to record by
proposing a test for when it should apply and discussing potential criticisms of a liberal right to record. This Note concludes
by discussing how courts and legislators can bring the law into
compliance with the right to record and identifying areas of
further scholarship.
overview of the development of the right to gather information and suggesting
criteria for determining who should be able to invoke this right).
13
Cf. Frederick Schauer, Must Speech Be Special?, 78 N.W. U. L. REV. 1284,
1298 (1983) (“The very reason we are concerned about the underlying theoretical
justification for the principle of freedom of speech, in a way that we are not with
respect to the age of the presidency and equal representation in the Senate, is that
the text is not clear, and we are therefore required to work out a theory of free
speech so that we can intelligently apply the vague words of the document.”
(internal footnotes omitted)).
14
This Note defines the democratic theory of free speech as the idea that the
freedom of speech is a necessary means to achieve democratic governance. It
defines the liberal theory of free speech as the idea that freedom of speech is an
aspect of personal autonomy that a government cannot strip from a sovereign
person. See infra Part III (elaborating further on these definitions and explaining
these theories).
15
See infra subpart IV.A.
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This Note has two important limitations. First, it assumes
that the First Amendment right to gather information at a minimum includes a right to record police officers performing their
duties in public. Although every circuit court to directly address the issue has concluded this is the case,16 the Supreme
Court has not spoken on the issue, and there are strong arguments that no such right exists.17 Second, this Note does not
seek to settle the age-old debate over whether the First Amendment or the broader right to free speech is a democratic or a
liberal right, or even whether these justifications are mutually
exclusive. Rather, this Note concludes only that the existing
Supreme Court doctrine regarding the right to gather information is squarely grounded in a liberal view of free speech, and
through this lens, the right to record cannot be logically limited
to recording police officers.
I
BACKGROUND
A. The Right to Gather Information
1. The Reporters’ Privilege
The right to gather information can be traced to the Supreme Court’s opinion in Branzburg v. Hayes, which was ironically a loss for the journalists trying to assert their First
Amendment right to gather information.18 Branzburg was a
consolidation of four cases in each of which journalists sought
to quash grand-jury subpoenas compelling them to testify
about the identity of their confidential sources.19 The journalists argued that the First Amendment immunized them against
the subpoenas because if they were forced to betray their
sources’ confidence, future sources would “be measurably de16
The Third and Fourth Circuits have held that there is no “clearly established” right to film police officers performing their duties in public such that a 42
U.S.C. § 1983 plaintiff can overcome qualified immunity. Kelly v. Borough of
Carlisle, 622 F.3d 248, 262 (3d Cir. 2010) (holding there is “insufficient case law
establishing a right to videotape police officers during a traffic stop to put a
reasonably competent officer on ‘fair notice’ that seizing a camera or arresting an
individual for videotaping police during the stop would violate the First Amendment”); Szymecki v. Houck, 353 F. App’x 852, 853 (4th Cir. 2009) (not precedential) (holding that the plaintiff’s “asserted First Amendment right to record police
activities on public property was not clearly established in this circuit at the time
of the alleged conduct”).
17
See, e.g., ACLU of Illinois v. Alvarez, 679 F.3d 583, 609 (7th Cir. 2012)
(Posner, J., dissenting) (cautioning against expansion of First Amendment rights
that threatens public safety and privacy interests).
18
408 U.S. 665 (1972).
19
See id. at 668–78.
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terred from furnishing publishable information, all to the detriment of the free flow of information protected by the First
Amendment.”20 The Court rejected this argument,21 but in
framing the issue it crucially clarified that “it [is not] suggested
that news gathering does not qualify for First Amendment protection; without some protection for seeking out the news, freedom of the press could be eviscerated.”22
In addition to its explicit endorsement of the right to gather
information, the Court’s lengthy treatment of the historic importance of grand juries and their investigatory powers further
evinces that the Court intended that its holding be narrowly
applied to the facts of the case and that it indeed envisioned
there is a right to gather information that simply was not implicated.23 This view is bolstered by Justice Lewis F. Powell Jr.’s
short but notorious concurrence, which called for a case-bycase determination as to whether a journalist was entitled to a
privilege from subpoena by balancing the journalists’ First
Amendment interests against the state’s need for the
information.24
Indeed, Justice Powell’s concurrence cast considerable
confusion over the Court’s opinion and the state of the socalled reporters’ privilege. Lower courts responded by reading
Powell’s concurrence in conjunction with Justice Potter
Stewarts’s dissent to establish a qualified reporters’ privilege.25
Thus, this special First Amendment privilege, grounded in the
20

Id. at 680.
The Court discussed five reasons: (1) not all incidental burdens on speech
violate the First Amendment, id. at 682; (2) the institutional press enjoys no
greater rights to information than ordinary citizens, id. at 684; (3) there was no
such privilege at common law, id. at 685; (4) grand juries are historically important, id. at 686–88; and (5) the journalists’ fears of a chilling effect on the flow of
news were overblown, id. at 693–95.
22
Id. at 681. The Court reemphasized this point later in the opinion and
suggested that the First Amendment could sometimes be grounds to squash a
subpoena: “[A]s we have earlier indicated, news gathering is not without its First
Amendment protections, and grand jury investigations if instituted or conducted
other than in good faith, would pose wholly different issues for resolution under
the First Amendment.” Id. at 707–08.
23
See id. at 686–88, 693–95.
24
Id. at 710 (Powell, J., concurring).
25
See, e.g., Zerilli v. Smith, 656 F.2d 705, 714 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (holding that
protection of a news reporter’s sources in many situations outweighs the interest
of compelling disclosure of those sources under the First Amendment); Bruno &
Stillman, Inc. v. Globe Newspaper Co., 633 F.2d 583, 595–96 (1st Cir. 1980)
(explaining that courts must balance the potential harm to the flow of information
when considering when to allow disclosure of reporter sources); see also Stephen
Bates, Overruling a Higher Court: The Goodale Gambit and Branzburg v. Hayes, 14
NEXUS 17, 25 (2009) (detailing how the lower courts have been deferential to
reporters’ privilege in protecting their sources).
21
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press’ right to gather information, soon became near-universal
law; in the years following Branzburg, only the Sixth Circuit
read Branzburg to deny the reporters’ privilege altogether.26
Regardless of the uncertainty surrounding Branzburg’s holding, the Court has repeated Branzburg’s dicta that “news gathering is not without its First Amendment protections,”27 and
“without some protection for seeking out the news, freedom of
the press could be eviscerated.”28
2. Access to Government Information
Following Branzburg, the Court addressed a series of cases
over whether the First Amendment right to gather information
means the government must provide the media access to certain information. The Court in Pell v. Procunier and Saxbe v.
Washington Post Co. affirmed substantially identical policies of
the California Department of Corrections and the Federal Bureau of Prisons, respectively, limiting face-to-face interviews
between the members of the media and prison inmates.29 Both
policies restricted prisoners to receiving visitors with whom
they had some prior personal relationship, but allowed journalists to tour the prisons and “stop and speak about any subject
to any inmates whom they might encounter.”30 Journalists
could also request a randomly selected group of inmates to
interview, but they could not interview whomever they
wished.31 Rejecting the journalists’ claims, the Court held that
26
See Storer Commcn’ns, Inc. v. Giovan (In re Grand Jury Proceedings), 810
F.2d 580, 584 (6th Cir. 1987); Bates, supra note 25, at 26–27. More recently,
though, the tide has begun to turn away from the qualified reporters’ privilege.
The Seventh Circuit rejected the privilege on first impression in 2003, McKevitt v.
Pallasch, 339 F.3d 530, 533 (7th Cir. 2003), and the D.C. Circuit soon thereafter
distinguished its prior holding in Zerilli, 656 F.2d at 714, to hold that Branzburg
categorically denied a reporters’ privilege in criminal cases, In re Grand Jury
Subpoena, Judith Miller, 397 F.3d 964, 972 (D.C. Cir. 2005).
27
Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 833 (1974) (quoting Branzburg, 408 U.S. at
707).
28
Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 576 (1980) (quoting
Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 681).
29
Saxbe v. Washington Post Co., 417 U.S. 843, 846–48 (1974); Pell, 417 U.S.
at 830–31.
30
Pell, 417 U.S. at 830; see also Saxbe, 417 U.S. at 846–48 (describing
substantially identical Federal Bureau of Prisons Policy Statement).
31
Saxbe, 417 at 846–48; Pell, 417 U.S. at 830. The prisons argued that if
journalists could single out prisoners for interviews, the press would focus its
interests on a select group of inmates who would then become “virtual ‘public
figures’ within the prison society and . . . bec[o]me the source of severe disciplinary problems.” Pell, 417 U.S. at 831–32. Indeed, the California Department of
Corrections claimed its past “liberal posture with regard to press interviews” was
in part to blame for a fatal escape attempt. Hillery v. Procunier, 364 F. Supp. 196,
198 (N.D. Cal. 1973).

R
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the Constitution grants the press no greater rights than members of the ordinary public and does not impose “upon government the affirmative duty to make available to journalists
sources of information not available to members of the public
generally.”32 Thus, the Court held that the policies were permissible insofar as they granted the press at least as much
access as the general public.33
Justice Powell’s dissenting opinion in Saxbe revealed the
Justices’ differing conceptions of the right to gather information and indeed the nature of the First Amendment itself. Powell, in contrast to the majority, envisioned a First Amendment
that imposes an affirmative duty on the government to facilitate
the free-flow of information.34 Powell agreed with the majority’s
premise that the Constitution grants the press only the same
rights as the public but argued that the First Amendment nevertheless prevents the government from denying members of
the public certain information without sufficient reason to do
so.35 Emphasizing “the societal function of the First Amendment in preserving free public discussion of governmental affairs” and the public’s reliance on the press to facilitate public
discussion,36 Powell warned that “[a]t some point official restraints on access to news sources, even though not directed
solely at the press,” would “undermine the function of the First
Amendment.”37 Thus, he concluded that “it is both appropriate and necessary” that the press’ access to information does
not give way to mere “discretionary authority and administrative convenience.”38
The Court significantly broadened Pell and Saxbe in
Houchins v. KQED, Inc.39 In that case, a broadcasting company
sued to gain access to a county jail after an inmate committed
32
Pell, 417 U.S. at 834; see also Saxbe, 417 U.S. at 850 (holding the case to
be constitutionally indistinguishable from Pell and affirming that the Constitution
does not require information be available to journalists that is not available to the
general public).
33
See Saxbe, 417 U.S. at 850; Pell, 417 U.S. at 835.
34
See Saxbe, 417 U.S. at 862 (Powell, J., dissenting). Justice Powell incorporated his Saxbe dissent into his Pell dissent. See Pell, 417 U.S. at 835 (Powell, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part).
35
See Saxbe, 417 U.S. at 857 (Powell, J., dissenting).
36
Id. at 862–63 (Powell, J., dissenting).
37
Id. at 860 (Powell, J., dissenting).
38
Id. (Powell, J., dissenting). Applying precedent from a prior case involving
prisoner communications, Justice Powell opined the regulations were unconstitutional because their blanket application was broader than necessary for prison
officials to maintain order. Id. at 868 (Powell, J., dissenting).
39
438 U.S. 1 (1978).
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suicide, purportedly because of conditions in the jail.40 The
sheriff offered to allow journalists to take part in a public tour
of the jail, but the journalists would not be able to take pictures
or audio or video recordings, would only see parts of the jail,
and would not have access to inmates.41 Citing Pell and Saxbe,
the Court sided with the sheriff, using broad language to flatly
reject “any notion that the First Amendment confers a right of
access to news sources.”42 The Court recognized that
Branzburg endorsed the right to gather information but limited
that right to “an undoubted right to gather news ‘from any
source by means within the law.’”43
Justice John Paul Stevens dissented from Houchins with
an opinion that echoed many of the sentiments of Justice Powell’s dissent in Saxbe. He argued that the First Amendment is
meant to ensure the free flow of information necessary for selfgovernance and, as such, the right to gather information exists
“not for the private benefit of those who might qualify as representatives of the ‘press’ but to insure that the citizens are fully
informed regarding matters of public interest and importance.”44 Justice Stevens distinguished Pell and Saxbe by arguing that the regulations in those cases still left the public
with ample alternative channels to examine prison conditions
but that the regulations in question “unduly restricted the opportunities of the general public to learn about the conditions
of confinement in Santa Rita jail.”45
40

Id. at 3–4.
Id. at 5.
42
Id. at 11.
43
Id. (quoting Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 681–82 (1972)). One could
doubt whether this formulation of the right to gather information is a really a right
to gather information at all. To say that the right extends to means within the law
seems akin to saying that one has a right to criticize the President as long as
Congress does not forbid criticism of the President. This could hardly be considered a right to free speech. Another characterization of this formulation of the
right to gather information, however, is that the government cannot specifically
forbid information-gathering activity, but can impose regulations targeting other
governmental interests without regard to the incidental burdens on information
gathering. Cf. Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 830 (1974) (“We note at the outset
that this regulation is not part of an attempt by the State to conceal the conditions
in its prisons or to frustrate the press’ investigation and reporting of those conditions.”). But, as Justice Powell noted in his Saxbe dissent, this rule would conflict
the Court’s holding in United States v. O’Brien that any incidental burden on
speech must be no greater than necessary to further an important governmental
interest unrelated to the speech itself. See Saxbe v. Washington Post Co., 417
U.S. 843, 858 (1974) (Powell, J., dissenting); United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S.
367, 377 (1968).
44
Houchins, 438 U.S. at 32 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
45
Id. at 29–30 (Stevens, J., dissenting). See generally Barry Sullivan, FOIA
and the First Amendment: Representative Democracy and the People’s Elusive
41
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By the time the Court had the opportunity to reexamine the
question of access to government information, Pell, Saxbe, and
Houchins had solidified into well-settled law. In 1999, the
Court in Los Angeles Police Department v. United Reporting Publishing Corp. considered whether a California law restricting
access to arrestee’s addresses was a facial First Amendment
violation.46 Although the Court was divided over whether the
respondent-plaintiff could alternatively succeed on Equal Protection grounds, all nine Justices agreed: “California could decide not to give out arrestee information at all without violating
the First Amendment.”47 Even Justice Stevens, who dissented
in Houchins, conceded in dissent that “the majority is surely
correct” that California had no First Amendment duty to provide access to this information.48
3. Access to Criminal Proceedings
The Court first considered whether the First Amendment
granted the public a right to attend criminal proceedings in
Gannett Co., Inc. v. DePasquale but ultimately disposed of the
case without deciding the issue.49 Nevertheless, the issue provoked debate among the Justices over the right to gather information in a series of concurring and dissenting opinions.
Justice Powell wrote a concurring opinion in which he argued
that the First Amendment right to gather information provides
the public with a limited right to attend criminal proceedings
weighed against the defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to a
fair trial.50 He concluded that the appropriate question in
these cases is “whether a fair trial for the defendant is likely to
be jeopardized by publicity, if members of the press and public
are present and free to report prejudicial evidence that will not
be presented to the jury.”51 Justice William Rehnquist argued
in direct opposition to Justice Powell that the Court’s prece“Right to Know,” 72 MD. L. REV. 1, 43–67 (2012) (describing how Houchins fits into
the broader debate surrounding the constitutional “right to know”).
46
528 U.S. 32, 34 (1999).
47
Id. at 40; see also id. at 41 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“[T]he fact that it is
formally nothing but a restriction upon access to government information is determinative.”); id. at 42 (Ginsburg, J., concurring) (“I join the Court’s opinion,
which recognizes that California Government Code § 6254(f)(3) is properly analyzed as a restriction on access to government information, not as a restriction on
protected speech. That is sufficient reason to reverse the Ninth Circuit’s judgment.” (internal citation omitted)).
48
Id. at 45 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
49
443 U.S. 368, 392 (1979).
50
See id. at 398–99 (Powell, J., concurring).
51
Id. at 400 (Powell, J., concurring).
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dents made clear that there is no right of access to government
proceedings, which include criminal proceedings.52 Justice
Harry Blackmun and the remaining three Justices agreed with
Justice Rehnquist.53
Despite five Justices seeming to agree in Gannett that the
public has no First Amendment right to attend criminal proceedings, the Court held a year later in Richmond Newspapers,
Inc. v. Virginia that this right indeed exists.54 Although the
Court was badly divided in its reasoning, six Justices explicitly
endorsed some sort of right to gather information as the basis
for open trials.55 Chief Justice Burger grounded his plurality
opinion in Branzburg’s dicta that the First Amendment must
include “some protection for seeking out the news”56 and characterized the right to attend criminal trials “as assured by the
amalgam of the First Amendment guarantees of speech and
press.”57 Chief Justice Warren Burger distinguished the
prison-access cases because “[p]enal institutions do not share
the long tradition of openness” that criminal trials enjoy.58
Thus, the plurality appeared to hold that the First Amendment
guarantees a right for the public to access any information to
which it has historically enjoyed access.
Justice William J. Brennan Jr. and Justice Stewart more
explicitly grounded their opinions in the right to gather information. Echoing the rhetoric Justice Powell used in his Saxbe
dissent, Justice Brennan—joined by Justice Thurgood
52

See id. at 404–05 (Rehnquist, J., concurring).
Justice Blackmun and the three Justices who joined his dissenting opinion
likewise dismissed the notion of a First Amendment right for the public to attend
criminal proceedings in favor of a Sixth Amendment right, which the majority
rejected. Id. at 442–43, 447 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part) (rejecting First Amendment theory because “this case involves no restraint
upon publication or upon comment about information already in the possession
of the public or the press”).
54
448 U.S. 555, 580 (1980).
55
See id. at 576, 587–88, 599. Justice Powell did not participate in the
decision but had been among the right to gather information’s most vocal proponents in prior cases. See, e.g., Gannett, 443 U.S. at 400 (Powell, J., concurring);
Saxbe v. Washington Post Co., 417 U.S. 843, 858 (1974) (Powell, J., dissenting).
56
Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. at 576 (quoting Branzburg v. Hayes, 408
U.S. 665, 681 (1972)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
57
Id. at 577.
58
Id. at 576 n.11. The Court discussed the “unbroken, uncontradicted history” of the public trial at common law at great length, and concluded it is “supported by reasons as valid today as in centuries past.” Id. at 573. This discussion
focused the need for the public to see criminals brought to justice as the primary
justification. See id. at 571 (“The crucial prophylactic aspects of the administration of justice cannot function in the dark; no community catharsis can occur if
justice is done in a corner or in any covert manner.” (internal quotation marks
and alterations omitted)).
53
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Marshall—drew upon the First Amendment’s role in “fostering
our republican system of self-government.”59 In this vein, he
concluded that one should consider the right to gather information in light of the “tradition of public entree to particular
proceedings or information” and “whether access to a particular government process is important in terms of that very process.”60 Justice Stewart tersely explained in a footnote citing
Branzburg—as if to take it as a forgone conclusion—that “[t]he
right to publish implies a freedom to gather information.”61
From this premise, Justice Stewart concluded that First
Amendment rights apply in the courtroom, and there is thus a
right to gather information from court proceedings.62
Richmond Newspapers was the first time the Court had
actually invoked the right to gather information in favor of the
party seeking to gather the information.63 In fact, the only
subsequent cases in which the Court held in favor of the information gatherer were open-court cases flowing directly from
Richmond Newspapers.64 Nevertheless, the open-court cases
unequivocally demonstrated that the First Amendment indeed
includes a right to gather information.
4. Generally Applicable Laws
One final line of cases substantially limited the right to
gather information by firmly establishing that generally appli59

Id. at 587 (Brennan, J., concurring).
Id. at 589 (citing In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 361–62 (1970)).
61
Id. at 599 n.2 (Stewart, J., concurring).
62
See id. at 599–600 (Stewart, J., concurring). Unlike the other Justices who
limited their reasoning to criminal proceedings, Justice Stewart advocated extending a right to attend civil proceedings as well. See id. at 599 (Stewart, J.,
concurring). Justice Blackmun, for his part, did not elaborate on why the public
has a right to attend criminal proceedings beyond noting the history and importance of open trials. See id. at 604 (Blackmun, J., concurring). He only reluctantly concluded that open trials were a First Amendment right after giving up on
convincing his colleagues it was better conceived as a Sixth Amendment right.
See id. at 603–04 (Blackmun, J., concurring). Only Justice Rehnquist dissented,
reiterating the point he made in his Gannett concurrence that the First Amendment provides no right of access whatsoever. See id. at 605 (Rehnquist, J.,
dissenting).
63
This fact was not lost on Justice Stevens, who celebrated this milestone as
a “watershed” achievement and used the occasion to lament the Court’s prior
holding in Houchins. Id. at 582–84 (Stevens, J., concurring) (“Until today the
Court has accorded virtually absolute protection to the dissemination of information or ideas, but never before has it squarely held that the acquisition of newsworthy matter is entitled to any constitutional protection whatsoever.”).
64
See, e.g., Press-Enter. Co. v. Superior Court, 464 U.S. 501, 508 (1984)
(extending Richmond Newspapers to voir dire); Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior
Court, 457 U.S. 596, 610 (1982) (invalidating a Massachusetts statute requiring
courtroom closure for testimony of minor sex-abuse victims).
60
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cable laws may burden the right to gather information without
running afoul of the First Amendment. Although this rule
came out of several decades of cases65—including Branzburg—
the preeminent case on the matter is Cohen v. Cowles Media
Co.66 In that case, the Court held that a newspaper could not
use the First Amendment to shield itself from a promissory
estoppel suit brought by a source whose confidentiality the
newspaper violated.67 The defendant-newspaper did not try to
argue that the right to gather information precluded the cause
of action but rather relied on a line of cases holding that newspapers have a right to publish “lawfully obtain[ed] truthful information about a matter of public significance.”68 But the
Court instead held, in broad language, that the First Amendment offered the defendant no protection because “generally
applicable laws do not offend the First Amendment simply because their enforcement against the press has incidental effects on its ability to gather and report the news.”69
Cohen is remarkable because it severely limits whatever
ground the right to gather information gained from Richmond
Newspapers and its progeny. Although factually distinct from
the right-of-access cases, the Court’s broad holding dispensed
with any notion that the First Amendment must allow access to
information where the public’s right to access outweighs the
government’s interest in restricting access.70 The Court in Cohen did not consider the public’s interest in knowing the
source’s identity, nor (by logical necessity) did it weigh this
interest against the plaintiff’s interest in seeing his promise
upheld.71 Without balancing these interests, the Court in Cohen implicitly rejected once and for all the position advanced by
several members of the Court that “the societal function of the
65
See, e.g., Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broad. Co., 433 U.S. 562, 574–75
(1977) (holding no First Amendment exception to state publicity-rights law); Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1, 20 (1945) (holding no First Amendment
exception to Sherman Act); Associated Press v. Nat’l Labor Relations Bd., 301 U.S.
103, 132–33 (1937) (holding no First Amendment exception to National Labor
Relations Act).
66
501 U.S. 663 (1991).
67
See id. at 665.
68
Id. at 668–69 (quoting Smith v. Daily Mail Publ’g Co., 443 U.S. 97, 103
(1979)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
69
Id. at 669.
70
Cf. Saxbe v. Washington Post Co., 417 U.S. 843, 862 (1974) (Powell, J.,
dissenting) (“No aspect of that constitutional guarantee is more rightly treasured
than [the First Amendment’s] protection of the ability of our people through free
and open debate to consider and resolve their own destiny.”).
71
See Cohen, 501 U.S. at 678 (Souter, J., dissenting) (“The importance of this
public interest is integral to the balance that should be struck in this case.”).
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First Amendment in preserving free public discussion of governmental affairs” drives the right to gather information.72 If
the necessity of the free flow of information was the driving
force behind the right to gather information, presumably some
generally applicable laws would be so detrimental to the freeflow of information to offend the First Amendment. After Cohen, the right to gather information seems to be that the First
Amendment categorically does not guarantee any access to information, but it prevents laws that directly target informationgathering activity or restrict information historically open to
the public.
B. The Right to Record Police Officers
A few important lower-court cases contributed to the right
to record and thus warrant brief discussion. In one line of
cases, courts have recognized First Amendment rights to film a
burglary from a public street,73 to photograph a fatal accident
scene from behind a reasonable police perimeter,74 and to more
broadly film matters of public interest.75 In the former two
cases, the district courts explained that this right applies wherever the photographer or videographer is standing in a place he
has a right to be and does “not unreasonably obstruct or interfere” with emergency responders.76 The Ninth Circuit in Fordyce v. City of Seattle did not have an opportunity to explore
the extent of the right to film matters of public interest because
of the case’s procedural posture.77
Two important circuit court cases recognize a possible
right to film public meetings. In Blackston v. Alabama, the
Eleventh Circuit held that two plaintiffs had stated a First
Amendment claim because they were denied their rights to
videotape a public meeting.78 Rather than a right to gather
72
73

Saxbe, 417 U.S. at 862–63 (Powell, J., dissenting).
See Channel 10, Inc. v. Gunnarson, 337 F. Supp. 634, 638 (D. Minn.

1972).
74

See Connell v. Town of Hudson, 733 F. Supp. 465, 473 (D.N.H. 1990).
See Fordyce v. City of Seattle, 55 F.3d 436, 439 (9th Cir. 1995). Fordyce
specifically addressed the arrest of a videographer filming a public protest, but the
Ninth Circuit broadly framed the plaintiff’s right in question as a “First Amendment right to film matters of public interest.” Id.
76
Channel 10, 337 F. Supp. at 638; see also Connell, 733 F. Supp. at 469
(quoting Channel 10, 337 F. Supp. at 638).
77
See Fordyce, 55 F.3d at 439 (reversing summary judgment order because
genuine issue of material fact existed as to whether defendant-police officer
sought to “prevent or dissuade” plaintiff-videographer from exercising First
Amendment right).
78
30 F.3d 117, 120 (11th Cir. 1994).
75
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information, the Eleventh Circuit framed this right as a right to
“expressive conduct.”79 The Eleventh Circuit explained that
this right might be subject to “time, place, and manner” restrictions, but it was not clear from the pleadings that the state had
met its burden for showing that this was an appropriate “time,
place, and manner” restriction.80
In Iacobucci v. Boulter, the First Circuit held that the police
violated the plaintiff’s constitutional rights by arresting him for
disorderly conduct when he was trying to film a public meeting.81 Although the plaintiff’s 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim was
predicated on his Fourth as opposed to his First Amendment
rights,82 the court’s reasoning in denying the defendant-police
officer qualified immunity necessarily relied upon a First
Amendment right to film public meetings. The Massachusetts
Supreme Judicial Court had limited the state’s disorderly conduct statute to exclude “activities . . . implicating the ‘lawful
exercise of a First Amendment right.’”83 Thus, in holding that
a reasonable police officer would not have arrested the plaintiff
for disorderly conduct, the court necessarily concluded—without further discussion—that the plaintiff’s “activities
were . . . done in the exercise of his First Amendment rights.”84
Although neither of these cases actually discussed the right to
gather information, courts would later interpret them this way
and use them to develop the right to record.85
The Eleventh Circuit was the first to explicitly recognize a
right to record police officers. The plaintiffs in Smith v. City of
Cumming sued a city police chief, alleging that officers
harassed the plaintiffs to prevent them from filming police activity.86 The court cited Blackston, Fordyce, and the District
Court’s opinion in Iacobucci for the proposition that “[t]he First
Amendment protects the right to gather information about
what public officials do on public property, and specifically, a
right to record matters of public interest.”87 The short Cumming opinion did not discuss the nature of the right to gather
79

Id.
See id.
81
See 193 F.3d 14, 25 (1st Cir. 1999).
82
See id. at 21.
83
Id. at 24 (quoting Commonwealth v. A Juvenile, 334 N.E.2d 617, 628
(Mass. 1975)).
84
Id. at 25.
85
See infra notes 86–94 and accompanying text.
86
212 F.3d 1332, 1332 (11th Cir. 2000).
87
Id. at 1333. The Eleventh Circuit nevertheless denied the plaintiffs’ § 1983
claim because they could not show that the defendant-police officers’ allegedly
harassing behavior actually violated this right. See id.
80

R
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information or explore the scope of the right to film public
officials that it announced. Nevertheless, the language the
court used points to two important takeaways: (1) the right is
not limited to filming police officers, and (2) public interest in
the dissemination of information of public importance drives
the right.
The First Circuit expanded Iacobucci in Glik v. Cunniffe to
hold that citizens have a clearly established First Amendment
right to film police officers performing their duties in public.88
The plaintiff in Glik sued a Boston police officer for arresting
the plaintiff for violating Massachusetts’ wiretapping statute
after the plaintiff filmed the defendant and other officers using
force while making an arrest.89 Harkening back to Branzburg,
the court began with the premise that the First Amendment
“encompasses a range of conduct related to the gathering and
dissemination of information.”90 Although the court did not
engage in much of a doctrinal discussion of the right to gather
information itself, the court noted that a right to film government officials serves the First Amendment’s broader purpose of
facilitating discussion of important topics.91
The court cited to Smith, Fordyce, Connell, and Channel 10,
Inc., among other cases, to support its conclusion.92 The court
also relied heavily on Iacobucci to show that the defendantpolice officer could not claim qualified immunity because the
right to record was clearly established in the First Circuit.93
The court noted that it had hardly discussed the First Amendment principles involved in Iacobucci but nevertheless justified
its reliance on the case by explaining that its passing attention
on the issue “implicitly speaks to the fundamental and virtually
self-evident nature of the First Amendment’s protections in this
area.”94
88

655 F.3d 78, 85 (1st Cir. 2011).
Id. at 79–80. This is the same statute that the woman discussed in the
introduction may have violated. See supra note 7 and accompanying text.
90
Id. at 82.
91
See id. (“Gathering information about government officials in a form that
can readily be disseminated to others serves a cardinal First Amendment interest
in protecting and promoting ‘the free discussion of governmental affairs.’” (quoting Mills v. Alabama, 384 U.S. 214, 218 (1966))).
92
Id. at 83.
93
Id. at 82–84.
94
Id. at 85. The court also noted that Smith and Fordyce addressed the
question in a similarly laconic manner. See id. at 84–85. The First Circuit applied
and refined the right announced in Glik in Gericke v. Begin, 753 F.3d 1 (1st Cir.
2014). In that case, the Court refused to grant police officers qualified immunity
in a § 1983 suit for arresting a woman for violating New Hampshire’s wiretapping
laws for filming police during a traffic stop. Id. at 4. In doing so, the Court
89
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The Seventh Circuit has provided the most substantive discussion in favor of the right to record police officers. In ACLU of
Illinois v. Alvarez, the ACLU sued the Cook County state’s attorney seeking to enjoin her from prosecuting the ACLU’s legal
observers for filming police officers under Illinois’ extraordinarily broad wiretapping laws.95 The court began with the uncontroversial premises that audiovisual recordings are modes of
speech and thus disseminating audiovisual recordings is protected speech. The court then noted that the necessary corollary of this is that the First Amendment also protects the
creation of audiovisual recordings.96 The court framed this
corollary as the First Amendment protecting the entirety of the
“speech process,” and not just the actual communicative act.97
The court buttressed this conclusion with Branzburg’s observation that there must be some right to gather information.98
After determining that the recording indeed implicates the
First Amendment, the court pivoted to see whether the Illinois
wiretapping statute could nevertheless be justified as applied.
The Court assumed that the law was generally applicable but
nevertheless subject to First Amendment scrutiny because the
law directly burdened communicative conduct.99 The court
then concluded that the law was content neutral and thus
could be justified as a time, place, and manner restriction if it
was narrowly tailored to fit an important government interest
and left open ample alternative channels of communication.100
Applying this intermediate scrutiny, the Court concluded that
the statute was too broad to be justified by privacy interests;
recognized that traffic stops may sometimes give rise to some particular circumstances under which the police could justifiably order a detainee to stop recording, but “a police order that is specifically directed at the First Amendment right to
film police performing their duties in public may be constitutionally imposed only
if the officer can reasonably conclude that the filming itself is interfering, or is
about to interfere, with his duties.” Id. at 8.
95
679 F.3d 583, 586 (7th Cir. 2012). The ACLU planned to implement a
“police accountability program” whereby ACLU videographers would film police
performing their duties in public. Id.; see generally Jocelyn Simonson, Copwatching, 104 CALIF. L. REV. 391, 407–27 (2016) (describing organized programs to
monitor police activity such as the one in dispute in Alvarez).
96
See Alvarez, 679 F.3d at 595–96 (“By way of a simple analogy, banning
photography or note-taking at a public event would raise serious First Amendment concerns; a law of that sort would obviously affect the right to publish the
resulting photograph or disseminate a report derived from the notes.”).
97
Id. at 596 (“Put differently, the eavesdropping statute operates at the front
end of the speech process by restricting the use of a common, indeed ubiquitous,
instrument of communication.”).
98
See id. at 596–98.
99
Id. at 602–03.
100
Id. at 603.
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the statute was over-inclusive, in that it prohibited recording
conversations that the speaker could not have expected to be
private, and under-inclusive, in that it did not prohibit observers from listening to conversations and taking notes by
hand.101
The courts in Smith, Glik, and Alvarez all narrowly framed
the question before them, but the principles they each announced have far broader implications. If audiovisual recording is a protected First Amendment activity, then the
government would need to meet intermediate scrutiny at a
minimum to justify any law curtailing audiovisual recording. A
better theoretical understanding of the right to gather information and why the First Amendment protects the right to record
will thus help delineate the extent to which the right to record
should apply.
II
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK
Any understanding of First Amendment doctrine is incomplete without a broader understanding of free speech. The law
and society take for granted that freedom of speech is a worthwhile goal,102 but the reasons for this are not always clear. At
the broadest level of analysis, free speech could be either a
formidable end in and of itself or a means of achieving some
other laudable result.103 In the former conceptualization, free
speech is often framed as a liberty right—whether premised on
the notion of freedom to live “the good life” or personal autonomy, the argument is that one’s speech is necessarily beyond
the reach of a liberal government.104 This Note refers to this as
a “liberal” theory of free speech. Alternatively, free speech is
often framed as a means to one of two ends: either the search
for truth or democratic governance.105 This Note refers to these
theories as “truth” and “democratic” theories of free speech,
respectively.
101
Id. at 606. The court also rejected the government’s claim that the law was
necessary to encourage police-civilian interactions, control the flow of information
of security matters, and prevent the escalation of certain police encounters. Id. at
607.
102
See generally FREDERICK SCHAUER, FREE SPEECH: A PHILOSOPHICAL ENQUIRY 63
(1982) (explaining the importance of free speech in a democratic society).
103
See id. at 5 (framing the question of whether free speech is an independent
principle or an instance of a broader principle).
104
See generally id. at 47–72 (surveying liberal theories of free speech).
105
See generally id. at 15–46 (surveying truth and democratic theories of free
speech).
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This Part provides a brief overview of the liberal and democratic theories as applied generally to the right to free
speech.106 This Note will not explore the possibility that a truth
theory of free speech drives the right to gather information for
two primary reasons. First, although their theoretical foundations are different, democratic and truth theories of free speech
would likely overlap in practice, which would render an analysis of a truth theory superfluous.107 Second, the literature
often casts the debate in American First Amendment doctrine
as primarily between liberal and democratic theories.108
A. Liberal Theory of Free Speech
The liberal theory of free speech, sometimes called the libertarian theory, is a non-consequentialist view that personal
autonomy necessarily includes freedom of conscience and thus
freedom of speech. Liberal theorists argue that a sovereign’s
power is limited to acts that do not interfere with the individual
autonomy of its citizens.109 At its most basic formulation, au106
A complete discussion of either theory is impracticable considering how
much ink scholars have spilt on the topic. This Part by necessity only captures a
small minority of viewpoints. Although a broader discussion may be desirable,
rather than wading into philosophical debates, the aim of this Part is to give the
reader the elementary understanding of each theory necessary to understand how
each would affect the right to gather information.
107
In essence, both theories ultimately advocate that as much information be
disseminated to the public debate as possible, but both are limited by their ultimate goals: i.e., free speech is only desirable to the extent that its negative effects
are outweighed by the benefit of revealing the truth or promoting self-governance.
Because the value of truth and self-governance are beyond the scope of this Note,
analyses on the limits of the right to gather information would be identical under
these theories. Likewise, as means to an end, both theories posit that free speech
must subordinate their overarching goals, so a democratic free speech theory
would disallow speech that threatens democratic principles, and a truth free
speech theory would disallow speech that is demonstrably false. But insofar as
this Note limits its analysis of the right to gather information as dealing in the
collection of raw data (as opposed to the creation, manipulation, or dissemination
of those data), it is difficult to imagine how the right to gather information could
implicate speech that directly undermines the truth or democracy, thus eliminating another area in which the practical application of these theories might diverge.
Cf. SCHAUER, supra note 102, at 45 (“An examination of the paradoxes and other
weaknesses of the argument from democracy reveals that much of its strength
derives not from its independent force, but from the extent to which it is a discrete
and important subset of the argument from truth.”).
108
See, e.g., FISS, supra note 3, at 2–3 (introducing the liberal/democratic
free-speech dichotomy); Nelson Tebbe, Government Nonendorsement, 98 MINN. L.
REV. 648, 665 (2013) (same).
109
See, e.g., Thomas Scanlon, A Theory of Freedom of Expression, 1 PHIL. &
PUB. AFF. 204, 215 (1972) (taking “the view that the powers of a state are limited to
those that citizens could recognize while still regarding themselves as equal, autonomous, rational agents”).

R
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tonomy means that a government cannot invade an individual’s thoughts.110 Assuming autonomous actors consider
information available to them when deciding how to think and
act, for a government to restrict the information available to its
citizens is thus to restrict its citizens’ autonomy. As Scanlon
explained:
The harm of coming to have false beliefs is not one that an
autonomous man could allow the state to protect him against
through restrictions on expression. For a law to provide such
protection it would have to be in effect and deterring potential
misleaders while the potentially misled remained susceptible
to persuasion by them. In order to be protected by such a law
a person would thus have to concede to the state the right to
decide that certain views were false and, once it had so decided, to prevent him from hearing them advocated even if he
might wish to.111

Apart from just demanding a right to receive information, freedom of conscience also assumes a right to communicate information. As Schauer writes, the former is dependent on the
latter:
[I]t is important to remember that language is not only the
medium of communication, it is also the medium of thinking.
We think not in complete abstractions, but (most commonly)
in words. Our ability to think creatively, therefore, is to a
great degree dependent upon our language. If communication is stifled, the development of language is restricted. To
the extent, therefore, that we curtail the development of linguistic tools, we chill the thought process that utilizes those
very same tools.112

None of this is to suggest that, under a strict liberal construction of free speech, the government may never restrict
actions with communicative value. An autonomous individual
may give the government the authority to protect oneself from
the non-communicative dangers of an act of expression113 or
110
See SCHAUER, supra note 102, at 68 (“Because thought may be inherently
as well as morally beyond the reach of state power, it is plausible to suggest that
the province of thought and individual decision-making is an area, or the only
area, in which the individual is truly autonomous.”).
111
Scanlon, supra note 109, at 217–18. Scanlon used autonomy to argue that
states cannot restrict expression: (1) to prevent falsehoods from harming those
who accept the falsehoods as truth, and (2) to prevent individuals from committing a harmful act because “the act of expression led the agents to believe (or
increased their tendency to believe) these acts to be worth performing.” Id. at 213.
112
SCHAUER, supra note 102, at 54.
113
To ask the government to protect oneself from a terrorist’s bomb, for example, is not the same as asking the government to protect oneself from the idea the
terrorist is trying to communicate.
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from those situations in which the ideas communicated cannot
contribute to rational thought.114 Likewise, the speaker’s freedom of conscience is only relevant to the extent that the expressive act could fairly be said to contribute to the speaker’s
subsequent thought process. To give an extreme illustration,
preventing a protestor from engaging in self-immolation does
not infringe on the protestor’s freedom of conscience because
the communicative value of the protestor’s actions, if completed, would not have an opportunity to further develop the
protestor’s thoughts on the subject. The question under a liberal theory of free speech must thus be whether the government can justify the restriction without reference to the harm
of the communicative aspect or without restricting the
speaker’s ability to develop her thoughts on the subject.
B. Democratic Theory of Free Speech
At the outset, the one thing that sets the democratic theory
of free speech apart from the liberal theory is that it is dependent upon broader democratic principles—to the extent one
rejects democracy as a desirable end, one must also reject freedom of speech.115 But to the extent that self-governance is a
laudable goal, democratic theorists argue that free speech is
necessary for a democratic system to function. At a most basic
level, freedom of speech is a means by which the sovereign (the
people) supervises its elected representatives (the government).116 Thus, freedom of speech under the democratic theory is not aimed at protecting any individual rights to selfexpression but those of society as a whole to have access to the
information necessary to inform the democratic process. As
Alexander Meiklejohn, the preeminent democratic free speech
theorist, observed:
The First Amendment, then, is not the guardian of unregulated talkativeness. It does not require that, on every occasion, every citizen shall take part in public debate. Nor can it
even give assurance that everyone shall have opportunity to
114
Scanlon gave the classic example of falsely shouting “fire” in a crowded
theater: “Part of what makes the restriction acceptable is the idea that the persons
in the theater who react to the shout are under conditions that diminish their
capacity for rational deliberation.” Scanlon, supra note 109, at 220.
115
See SCHAUER, supra note 102, at 35.
116
See id. at 36 (“First, freedom of speech is crucial in providing the sovereign
electorate with the information it needs to exercise its sovereign power, and to
engage in the deliberative process requisite to the intelligent use of that power.
Second, freedom to criticize makes possible holding government officials, as public servants, properly accountable to their masters, the population at large.”).

R
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do so. . . . What is essential is not that everyone shall speak,
but that everything worth saying shall be said. To this end,
for example, it may be arranged that each of the known conflicting points of view shall have, and shall be limited to, an
assigned share of the time available.117

To Meiklejohn and likeminded scholars, restrictions on
speech are thus permissible as long as they do not violate
“equality of status in the field of ideas.”118 In other words,
suppressing speech may sometimes be justified for various reasons, but to suppress speech because of the viewpoint it espouses is offensive to democratic principles and cannot be
justified in a democratic regime.
The democratic theory of free speech is thus similar to the
liberal theory of free speech in the sense that it forbids the
government from choosing which ideas are worthy of consideration. But while this result is the same, the justification behind each makes all the difference. The democratic theory only
justifies freedom of speech to the extent that the speech in
question contributes somehow to the political process.
Meiklejohn divided the world of speech into “public” and “private” speech; private speech, he argued, “must be under legislative control,” but freedom of public speech is absolute.119
The liberal theory, on the other hand, protects ideas more
broadly, not just those that implicate self-governance.120
Thus, under the democratic theory, the government could
justly dictate artistic taste (assuming the art in question is
demonstrably apolitical). But under the liberal theory, telling
someone she must prefer surrealism to impressionism would
be as offensive to that person’s autonomy as telling her that
she must prefer federalism to confederacy.

117
ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN, FREE SPEECH AND ITS RELATION TO SELF-GOVERNMENT
25–26 (1948).
118
Id. at 26.
119
Id. at 62–63. Meiklejohn did not argue private speech is without any protection, but argued that the First Amendment provides absolute protection to
public speech while the Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause “gives assurance
that a private need to speak will get the impartial consideration to which it is
entitled.” Id. at 63.
120
See Scanlon, supra note 109, at 214–15 (“[T]he [liberal] principle is the only
plausible principle of freedom of expression I can think of which applies to expression in general and makes no appeal to special rights (e.g., political rights) or to
the value to be attached to expression in some particular domain (e.g., artistic
expression or the discussion of scientific ideas).”).
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III
ANALYSIS
The Supreme Court’s right to gather information doctrine121 is best understood as a liberal free speech doctrine.
The doctrine as it exists puts no greater emphasis on “public”
speech as opposed to “private” speech. Nor does the importance of the information sought matter to the applicability of
the right. Although the public-trial cases spoke of the importance of public trials, the Court put significant weight on the
historical nature of the public trial.122 Taken in conjunction
with the prison-access cases, this suggests that the government may not suppress the collection of information already
available, but the government has no duty to make information
otherwise available, regardless of its public importance.
Initially, the dialogue between the majority and dissenters
in the Court’s right to gather information cases provides ample
evidence that the Court rejected a right to gather information
supported by a democratic theory of free speech. Justice Powell’s Saxbe dissent and Justice Steven’s Houchins dissent are
both replete with democratic free speech theory rhetoric.123
Invoking Meiklejohn, Justice Powell argued that the right to
gather information is paramount to democratic society:
What is at stake here is the societal function of the First
Amendment in preserving free public discussion of governmental affairs. No aspect of that constitutional guarantee is
more rightly treasured than its protection of the ability of our
people through free and open debate to consider and resolve
their own destiny. As the Solicitor General made the point,
“[t]he First Amendment is one of the vital bulwarks of our
national commitment to intelligent self-government.” It embodies our Nation’s commitment to popular self-determination and our abiding faith that the surest course for
developing sound national policy lies in a free exchange of
121

See supra subpart I.A.
See, e.g., Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia 448 U.S. 555, 569–70
(1980) (“[T]he historical evidence demonstrates conclusively that at the time when
our organic laws were adopted, criminal trials both here and in England had long
been presumptively open . . . [giving] assurance that the proceedings were conducted fairly to all concerned, and . . . discourage[ing] perjury, the misconduct of
participants, and decisions based on secret bias or partiality . . . . The early
history of open trials in part reflects the widespread acknowledgement, long
before there were behavioral scientists, that public trials had significant community therapeutic value.”).
123
See Houchins v. KQED, Inc., 438 U.S. 1, 30–38 (1978) (Stevens, J., dissenting); Saxbe v. Washington Post Co., 417 U.S. 843, 861–63 (1974) (Powell, J.,
dissenting).
122
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views on public issues. And public debate must not only be
unfettered; it must also be informed. For that reason this
Court has repeatedly stated that First Amendment concerns
encompass the receipt of information and ideas as well as the
right of free expression.124

Likewise, Justice Stevens argued for a right of access because “information gathering is entitled to some measure of
constitutional protection . . . to insure that the citizens are fully
informed regarding matters of public interest and
importance.”125
The majority countered by finding dispositive the general
applicability of the challenged regulations.126 The Court most
resoundingly rejected the notion that the democratic theory of
free speech supports the right to gather information in Cohen
when it declared that the right to gather information could
never be used to exempt an information seeker from an otherwise generally applicable law.127 This interpretation of the
right to gather information cannot be rectified with the democratic free speech theory.128
Because free speech under this theory is a means to an
end—the end being democratic governance—there are only two
factors that can logically be used to valuate speech: the value of
democratic governance and the contribution of the speech in
question to democratic governance. Thus, a restriction on
speech that protects against a harm greater than the loss of
democratic governance is justifiable as means to a more important end. Likewise, a restriction on speech that is irrelevant or
contrary to democratic governance is justifiable without reason
because the restricted speech has no value.129 That a law is
124
Saxbe, 417 U.S. at 862–63 (Powell, J., dissenting) (alteration in original)
(footnote and citations omitted); see also id. at 862 n.8 (“Indeed, Professor
Meiklejohn identified this aspect of the First Amendment as its paramount
value.”) (citing MEIKLEJOHN, supra note 117, at 26).
125
Houchins, 438 U.S. at 32 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
126
See id. at 16 (“[T]he media have no special right of access to the Alameda
County Jail different from or greater than that accorded the public generally.”);
Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 835 (1974) (“[S]ince § 415.071 does not deny the
press access to sources of information available to members of the general public,
we hold that it does not abridge the protections that the First and Fourteenth
Amendments guarantee.”).
127
See Cohen v. Cowles Media Co., 501 U.S. 663, 669 (1991).
128
See Thomas I. Emerson, Legal Foundations of the Right to Know, 1976
WASH. U. L.Q. 1, 16–19 (1976) (arguing that a democratic understanding of the
First Amendment must include some right of access to government information).
129
Cf. MEIKLEJOHN, supra note 117, at 25 (“If, for example, at a town meeting,
twenty like-minded citizens have become a ‘party,’ and if one of them has read to
the meeting an argument which they have all approved, it would be ludicrously
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generally applicable takes neither of these factors into account.
These laws treat political speech and pornography as peers and
ignore the gravity of the harm threatened by both. This proposition is best illustrated with an example from a more basic
exercise of speech: a law that forbids discussion of the president’s policies would be just as offensive to a democratic free
speech theory as a law that forbids only opposition party members from discussing the president’s policies. Although this
hypothetical law is generally applicable because it does not
target one set of views, it hinders the discussion of policy that
the sovereign public needs to properly supervise its elected
leader.130
That Cohen dealt with explicitly political speech should not
go unnoticed. The plaintiff in Cohen was a political operative
trying to leak information about a gubernatorial candidate’s
criminal record to the defendant-newspapers.131 The newspapers’ editors decided that, in their professional judgment, they
needed to renege on their promise to protect the plaintiff’s identity as an ally of the candidate’s opponent so that readers could
make fully informed decisions about how this information
should affect their votes.132 This speech thus implicates the
core of what democratic free speech theory seeks to protect:
fully informed self-governance.
One could argue that Cohen did not directly implicate democratic free speech values because the plaintiff was a private
actor seeking to restrict the speech through a private cause of
action—promissory estoppel. But the Court in Cohen explicitly
recognized that the state court creates a state action when it
enforces a promissory estoppel claim.133 Thus, the state
out of order for each of the others to insist on reading it again. No competent
moderator would tolerate that wasting of the time available for free discussion.”).
130
The democratic free speech theory does allow viewpoint-neutral restrictions in some cases. See id. at 26 (“[I]t may be arranged that each of the known
conflicting points of view shall have, and shall be limited to, an assigned share of
the time available.”). But this does not mean that the state can shut down discussion of a topic in its entirety. At the heart of the democratic free speech theory is
the idea that the government cannot restrict the sovereign electorate from receiving information relevant to its self-governance. See, e.g., SCHAUER, supra note
102, at 36 (“[F]reedom of speech is crucial in providing the sovereign electorate
with the information it needs to exercise its sovereign power . . . .”). Thus, while
the town meeting moderator in Meiklejohn’s famous analogy may restrict redundant or irrelevant discussion in the interest of time, MEIKLEJOHN, supra note 117,
at 25, he may not deem a politically relevant topic wholly unworthy of discussion.
131
See Cohen, 501 U.S. at 665.
132
See id. at 666.
133
See id. at 668; see also N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 265 (1964)
(“Although this is a civil lawsuit between private parties, the Alabama courts have
applied a state rule of law which petitioners claim to impose invalid restrictions on

R
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court—as a branch of the government—is acting on a private
citizen’s desire to impede upon the newspapers’ right to gather
information. That the desire to do so originated with a private
citizen does not change the fact that the government is the one
ultimately restricting the newspapers’ ability to speak freely.
The effect is therefore a government restriction on speech directly relevant to self-governance. The Court’s failure to analyze it as such shows that some principle other than the
democratic free speech theory drives its decision.
But a generally applicable restriction on speech can be
justified under a liberal theory of free speech, as long as the
harm it seeks to prevent does not arise from the communicative
aspect of the speech. This is because an individual can ask the
government to protect the individual from speech’s incidental
harm, just not from the potentially harmful ideas that the
speech conveys.134 The liberal theory thus takes a categorical
approach to restrictions on speech: if the harm the restriction
seeks to protect against is unrelated to the idea the speech
conveys, the restriction is justifiable without reference to the
gravity of the harm; but if the restriction seeks to protect
against a potentially harmful idea, the restriction is categorically impermissible without reference the importance of the
idea. Cohen and the prison-access cases are therefore completely consistent with the liberal theory of free speech because
the restrictions in question are justifiable without reference to
the ideas the speech expressed.
Concededly, Richmond Newspapers and its progeny appear
at first glance to support the democratic view of the right to
gather information. Indeed, Chief Justice Burger dedicated a
significant portion of his plurality opinion to discussing the
importance of public trials.135 But this reading of Richmond
Newspapers is irreconcilable with the Court’s refusal to contheir constitutional freedoms of speech and press.”); Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S.
1, 14 (1948) (“That the action of state courts and judicial officers in their official
capacities is to be regarded as action of the State within the meaning of the
Fourteenth Amendment, is a proposition which has long been established by
decisions of this Court.”).
134
Cf. Scanlon, supra note 109, at 217 (differentiating the “certain harms” the
state has a duty to protect against and “[t]he harm of coming to have false beliefs”
from which an autonomous individual cannot seek the state’s protection).
135
See Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 569–73 (1980)
(“[T]he open processes of justice serve an important prophylactic purpose, providing an outlet for community concern, hostility, and emotion. Without an awareness that society’s responses to criminal conduct are underway, natural human
reactions of outrage and protest are frustrated and may manifest themselves in
some form of vengeful ‘self-help,’ as indeed they did regularly in the activities of
vigilante ‘committees’ on our frontiers.”).
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sider the importance of media access to prisons in Houchins
just two years prior.136 Read properly, Chief Justice Burger’s
primary emphasis on the strong history of the open trial reveals
Richmond Newspaper’s correct meaning:137 because criminal
trials have always been open to the public, restricting access to
them is better conceptualized as depriving the public of information already available to it than as declining to grant the
public access to information not otherwise available to it.
This distinction is crucial. A democratic right to gather
information would likely support an open criminal trial—an
important part of governance—regardless of whether AngloAmerican society has historically done so. But a liberal right to
gather information is only offended once the state restricts access to information that has already been publically communicated. The difference can be thought of as a positive versus a
negative obligation. Although liberal theory permits an autonomous person to consent to submit herself to a government that
will not do everything in its power to ensure the individual’s
thoughts are as fully formed as possible, an autonomous person cannot consent to submit to a government that will actively
restrict the individual’s ability to fully formulate her thoughts;
to do so would be to sacrifice the one area that makes the
individual truly autonomous and thus undermine the validity
of her consent to be governed.138 So if the information disclosed at a criminal trial is conceptualized as already being
publicly available, then the state infringes upon individual autonomy by forbidding individuals from collecting this information to formulate their thoughts. But because information
within prisons is not already publicly available, the state does
not actively impede on thought development by failing to make
access to this information available.

136
This is not to suggest that the Court could not have denied the journalists
access to the prisons in these cases under a democratic free speech regime;
indeed, it could have weighed the relevant factors and determined that the harm
from disorder that access would threaten within the prisons outweighs the benefit
to self-governance that access would provide. But the Court simply did not engage in this analysis.
137
See Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. at 564–69.
138
See SCHAUER, supra note 102, at 68.
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IV
IMPLICATIONS
A. Applying the Right to Record
This understanding that the right to gather information is
based on a liberal view of free speech must drive the proper
readings of Smith, Glik, and Alvarez. To be consistent with
Supreme Court precedent, any First Amendment right to film
police officers in public must also protect a right to record
private citizens in public as well. Under the liberal theory of
free speech, this right is inherently a private right and thus
does not depend on the subject of the recording or the content
of the information to be recorded. The Supreme Court’s liberal
understanding of the right to gather information suggests a
three-part test for when the First Amendment protects recording a subject without the subject’s consent: The information
the videographer seeks to record must (1) be observable to the
videographer (2) from somewhere the videographer has a right
to be (3) under circumstances in which the subject does not
have a reasonable expectation of privacy.139
The first prong addresses the liberal notion that the government generally may not prevent its citizens from communicating information already available to them. As Kreimer
argues, once information is in public, it has “already been ‘supplied’ to the observer who seeks to record” it.140 In other words,
as soon as the information is observable or audible to third
parties, it becomes the prerogative of all who can observe or
hear it to communicate this information as they wish—including by taking an audiovisual recording.141 So if two people are
139
See generally Kreimer, supra note 1, at 355, 386 (surveying a broad range
of First Amendment recording issues through a liberal perspective).
140
Id. at 391.
141
There could be some debate over whether information must be observable
by the naked eye or audible by the naked ear before it is available to the videographer in a manner that the liberal theory of free speech cautions the government against restricting the communication of the information. On the one hand,
the liberal theory of free speech does not seem to distinguish between the means
by which the speaker comes to attain the information she seeks to communicate.
But on the other hand, allowing speakers to obtain such information through
advanced technological means (audio enhancing equipment, for instance), blurs
the distinction between information available to the speaker and information the
speaker has pried away from another source. Cf. Florida Star v. B.J.F., 491 U.S.
524, 535 (1989) (distinguishing between publishing personal information that is
already publicly available and publishing personal information acquired through
unlawful means); Margot E. Kaminski, Regulating Real-World Surveillance, 90
WASH. L. REV. 1113, 1158–65 (2015) (discussing how technological innovations
make surveillance increasingly possible in formerly private places). Resolving this
question would require a separate analysis that is beyond the scope of this Note.
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having a conversation in a public square and a third person
can observe their interactions and hear their conversations,
the first prong of this test has been met because to restrict the
recording would be to restrict the third person from communicating information already available to her.142
The liberal theory of free speech would not allow this restriction unless communicating this information threatens
some harm separate from the ideas expressed by communicating the information. This is the basis for the test’s second and
third prongs: recording may nevertheless be restricted if the
videographer is trespassing or the subjects of the recording
have a reasonable expectation of privacy. To begin with the
second prong, one could argue that even when the recorder is
trespassing, any observable information has nevertheless been
made available to the recorder and therefore the state cannot
prevent its communication. But the state can prevent the separate harm caused by the act of trespass—which by logical
extension includes information gathered while trespassing—
without violating any liberal notions of free speech. This is
consistent with the Supreme Court doctrine that the media
may be liable for disseminating unlawfully obtained speech143
and with Cohen’s holding that generally applicable laws do not
offend the right to gather information if they burden information gathering activity.144 Therefore, this right may only be
exercised when the videographer may observe the information
from somewhere she is entitled to be without question of
whether or not she is recording anyone.145
For present purposes, the question is moot because any information that is communicated but is not observable by the naked eye or audible by the naked ear
would likely have been communicated with a reasonable expectation of privacy.
Thus, the videographer would fail the test’s third prong regardless of whether or
not she could pass the first prong.
142
Cf. Kreimer, supra note 1, at 390 (“Prohibitions of image capture are not
directed against the ‘gathering’ of information from unwilling sources; they bar
the act of recording for future review impressions already gathered by
observers.”).
143
See Florida Star, 491 U.S. at 534 (“[T]he Daily Mail formulation only protects the publication of information which a newspaper has ‘lawfully obtained’ . . . .” (quoting Smith v. Daily Mail Publ’g Co., 443 U.S. 97, 103 (1979))
(internal alterations omitted)).
144
Cohen v. Cowles Media Co., 501 U.S. 663, 669 (1991); see also supra
section I.A.4 (presenting the line of cases establishing that generally applicable
laws may constitutionally burden the right to gather information).
145
It should be emphasized that this second prong does not restrict the right
to record to public spaces; rather, the videographer may record as long as she is
not trespassing. Thus, a videographer could record a patron dining at a restaurant as long as the videographer has the proprietor’s permission to do so. The
proprietor may exercise her right to exclude the videographer from her property,
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As for the third prong, beyond trespassing, the harm the
recording threatens would almost invariably be the invasion of
the subject’s privacy.146 Although the exact harm that invasion of privacy poses is often intangible and thus difficult to
define for the purposes of a legal test,147 the common-law invasion of privacy tort causes of action, which reflect centuries of
Anglo-American wisdom, support the notion that there should
be no legally recognized harm to the subject’s privacy interests
when the subject did not have a reasonable expectation of privacy. There are two common-law invasion of privacy torts that
implicate recording subjects without their consent: “unreasonable publicity given to the other’s private life” and “unreasonable intrusion upon the seclusion of another.”148 But the
elements of reasonableness, privacy, and seclusion strictly exclude a cause of action based on nonconsensual recording

but in this circumstance the government—on its own or through a private action
by the recording’s subject—is prevented from restricting the recording, assuming
of course that the other two prongs are met.
146
One could even question whether the harm caused by an invasion of privacy is distinctive enough from the ideas expressed through the recording that a
liberal government can seek to prevent it. This philosophical question is beyond
the scope of this Note, which assumes for present purposes that the invasion of
privacy indeed presents a distinctive harm.
There may be additional, case-specific harms that recording can cause. To
return to the example of recording police, which framed this Note, recording might
still be constitutionally prohibited if the actual act of recording interferes with the
officers’ duties. See Gericke v. Begin, 753 F.3d 1, 8 (1st Cir. 2014) (“[A] police
order that is specifically directed at the First Amendment right to film police
performing their duties in public may be constitutionally imposed only if the
officer can reasonably conclude that the filming itself is interfering, or is about to
interfere, with his duties.”); Justin Welply, Comment, When, Where and Why the
First Amendment Protects the Right to Record Police Communications: A Substantial Interference Guideline for Determining the Scope of the Right to Record and for
Revamping Restrictive State Wiretapping Laws, 57 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 1085,
1106–10 (2013) (proposing a “substantial interference” test for when recording
police officers can be constitutionally prohibited). This Note does not seek to
address all possible scenarios when recording threatens some harm unrelated to
the idea expressed, but such cases should still be analyzed under the principles
expressed herein.
147
See Kaminski, supra note 141, at 1115–16 (“[M]erely identifying the government interest in surveillance laws as an interest in privacy protection is inadequate because privacy can mean many different things.”). Kaminski argues that
privacy can best be conceptualized as “boundary management”—that is, “the
process of dynamically managing the degree of disclosure of one’s self to others.”
Id. at 1116. Under this framework, she concludes, the government has an interest in “in preventing people from miscalculating their boundaries” by misunderstanding the level of publicity to which their actions are exposed, and protecting
people against having to change their behaviors in light of new technologies and
other intrusions on previously private spheres. Id. at 1135.
148
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652A(2)(a), (c) (AM. LAW INST. 1977).
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when the subject does not have a reasonable expectation of
privacy.149
B. Potential Critiques
A plausible criticism is that this conclusion is inherently
incompatible with the courts’ holdings in Smith, Glik, and Alvarez—that is, these cases can only be read with a foundation in
a democratic theory of the right to gather information and simply are not supported by the Supreme Court’s precedent in this
area. It is true that the courts in all three cases—especially
Glik—found it significant that the subjects of the recordings at
issue were police officers.150 Although this seemingly invokes a
democratic view of the right to gather information because of
the democratic importance of monitoring public servants, it
may still be consistent insofar as police officers working in
149
See id. § 652B cmt. c (“Nor is there liability for observing him or even taking
his photograph while he is walking on the public highway, since he is not then in
seclusion, and his appearance is public and open to the public eye.”); id. § 652D
cmt. b (“[T]here is no liability for giving further publicity to what the plaintiff
himself leaves open to the public eye.”); cf. Florida Star v. B.J.F., 491 U.S. 524,
532 n.7 (1989) (“[P]rivacy interests fade once information already appears on the
public record.”). It should be noted that these traditional torts have faced criticism amid the robust and ongoing debate around privacy rights. See, e.g., Danielle Keats Citron, Mainstreaming Privacy Torts, 98 CALIF. L. REV. 1805, 1825–26
(2010) (arguing that certain modern “privacy problems fall outside the four privacy torts.”); Kaminski, supra note 141, at 1124–25 (lamenting the insufficiency
of the “the private-public binary” reflected in the common law privacy torts); Neil
M. Richards & Daniel J. Solove, Prosser’s Privacy Law: A Mixed Legacy, 98 CALIF.
L. REV. 1887, 1918 (2010) (arguing that “[t]ort law has not emerged as the leading
protector of privacy” because “[p]rivacy tort cases have proven quite difficult for
plaintiffs to win, and the torts have not kept pace with contemporary privacy
problems”). Nevertheless, the requirement that invasion-of-privacy plaintiffs had
a reasonable expectation of privacy is not seriously undermined by these criticisms. Kaminski, for example, argues that one of the government’s interests in
privacy law is protecting people from surveillance in situations in which they have
a reasonable but mistaken expectation of privacy. See Kaminski, supra note 141,
at 1136 (“[The government’s] interest [in privacy laws] is implicated when a person
has a desired degree of openness to the world, but miscalculates her use of
management mechanisms based on settled expectations about her
environment.”).
150
See ACLU of Illinois v. Alvarez, 679 F.3d 583, 597 (7th Cir. 2012) (“[T]he
First Amendment interests are quite strong. On the factual premises of this case,
the eavesdropping statute prohibits nonconsensual audio recording of public officials performing their official duties in public.”); Glik v. Cunniffe, 655 F.3d 78, 82
(1st Cir. 2011) (“Gathering information about government officials in a form that
can readily be disseminated to others serves a cardinal First Amendment interest
in protecting and promoting the ‘free discussion of governmental affairs.’ . . . This
is particularly true of law enforcement officials . . . .”); Smith v. City of Cumming,
212 F.3d 1332, 1333 (11th Cir. 2000) (“The First Amendment protects the right to
gather information about what public officials do on public property, and specifically, a right to record matters of public interest.”).
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public should expect some level of public scrutiny and therefore have a diminished expectation of privacy. This observation
might make a given set of facts more compelling, but it does not
undermine the conclusion that the right established in these
cases must extend to recordings of private citizens. Even if
police officers generally have a lower expectation of privacy
when working in public, it would be an overly broad and unprincipled generalization to declare that only police officers so
lack an expectation of privacy that the First Amendment protects recording them but not private citizens.151
Another potential criticism is that this Note ignores the
gravity of the privacy interests at stake even when a person
does not have a reasonable expectation of privacy. That is,
although the subject of the recording may reasonably expect
that passersby will observe him and overhear his conversations, the harm posed by recording the subject may nevertheless supersede the videographer’s right to record.152 As Lipton
notes, the nature of audiovisual recordings and their easy dissemination pose significant threats to privacy.153 In particular,
the argument goes, modern video recordings can be produced
and disseminated worldwide instantaneously by almost anyone, and they can serve as powerful assertions of fact despite
potentially lacking crucial context.154 Indeed, a number of
151
Cf. Alvarez, 679 F.3d at 605–06 (dismissing the argument that police officers had an expectation of privacy during audible conversations on public
streets). An alternative explanation is that there is no actual invasion of privacy if
the information is of public concern. Indeed, that publicized information “is not of
legitimate concern to the public” is an element for a common-law “Publicity Given
to Private Life” tort claim. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652D (AM. LAW INST.
1977). But defining the harm police officers face when they are recorded in terms
of this common-law tort is both over- and under-inclusive: it assumes that all
conversations police officers will have while performing their duties in public will
be “of legitimate concern to the public” and also requires that the information
recorded be subsequently “give[n] publicity.” Id. Smith and Glik do not contemplate either factor, and the court in Alvarez only briefly touches upon the former.
See Alvarez, 679 F.3d at 606 n.12 (“The communications at issue here are not
[covered by this tort].”); id. at 611–12 (Posner, J., dissenting) (“In some instances
such publicity would violate the tort right of privacy.”).
152
Cf. Julie E. Cohen, Examined Lives: Informational Privacy and the Subject
as Object, 52 STAN. L. REV 1373, 1425 (2000) (“The injury, here, does not lie in the
exposure of formerly private behaviors to public view, but in the dissolution of the
boundaries that insulate different spheres of behavior from one another.”); Kaminski, supra note 141, at 1125–26 (criticizing the traditional “binary” approach
to privacy law that distinguishes between information revealed inside and outside
the home).
153
Jacqueline D. Lipton, “We, the Paparazzi”: Developing a Privacy Paradigm
for Digital Video, 95 IOWA L. REV. 919, 927 (2010).
154
Id. at 927–28.
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commentators have advocated expanding invasion of privacy
torts to include invasions of privacy in public spaces.155
This criticism invokes a wider debate between the First
Amendment and privacy rights that is beyond the scope of this
Note. For present purposes, two counterpoints suffice: (1) exempting situations in which a person, despite being in public,
has a reasonable expectation of privacy addresses the most
troublesome invasions of the person’s private affairs; and (2)
the harms threatened in situations in which a person does not
have a reasonable expectation of privacy may nevertheless be
excluded from First Amendment protection through other doctrines such as libel. First, the most prominent concern regarding recording in public places is the ease and proliferation of
voyeurism.156 Specifically, commentators rightfully worry
about the ease of photographing—or recording—one’s genitals
or other intimate areas with mobile technology.157 But although such voyeurs may be able to meet the first and second
prongs of the proposed test, they would almost invariably fail
the third; social norms clearly dictate that one has a reasonable expectation of privacy to their parts under their clothes.158
Indeed, many anti-voyeurism laws mandate that the victim has
a reasonable expectation of privacy, which they specify the victim can have in a public place.159
155
See, e.g., Josh Blackman, Omniveillance, Google, Privacy in Public, and the
Right to Your Digital Identity: A Tort for Recording and Disseminating an Individual’s Image Over the Internet, 49 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 313, 354 (2009) (proposing
multifactor balancing test imposing liability for violating one’s right to his or her
digital identity by disseminating digital images or recordings); Aimee Jodoi Lum,
Comment, Don’t Smile, Your Image Has Just Been Recorded on a Camera-Phone:
The Need for Privacy in the Public Sphere, 27 U. HAW. L. REV. 377, 412 (2005)
(proposing cause of action in tort for “recording an image in public of another’s
intimate area(s), without that person’s consent” (footnote omitted)); Andrew Jay
McClurg, Bringing Privacy Law out of the Closet: A Tort Theory of Liability for
Intrusions in Public Places, 73 N.C. L. REV. 989, 1058–59 (1995) (proposing a
multifactor balancing test imposing liability for intrusion into one’s privacy that is
“highly offensive to a reasonable person,” even if intruded upon affairs are “open
to public inspection”).
156
See Blackman, supra note 155, at 360; Lum, supra note 155, at 379.
157
See Blackman, supra note 155, at 360; Lum, supra note 155, at 379.
158
The expectation remains regardless of one’s choice of outfit. See Lum,
supra note 155, at 412 n.252 (“Skimpy thongs, bras, and other similar lingerie are
commonly worn, and can shift with the slightest movement of the wearer, thereby
exposing intimate areas partially, albeit underneath clothing. This should not
compromise women’s expectation of privacy for those intimate areas.”).
159
See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 1801(b)(5)(B) (2012) (defining “reasonable expectation
of privacy” as a reasonable belief “that a private area of the individual would not
be visible to the public, regardless of whether that person is in a public or private
place”); WASH. REV. CODE § 9A.44.115(2)(b) (2003) (criminalizing filming of intimate areas “under circumstances where the person has a reasonable expectation
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Furthermore, a harmful recording of a subject in a circumstance in which the subject does not have a reasonable expectation to privacy will often fall into a separate category of
unprotected speech. For example, Lipton expressed concern
that recordings pose special privacy concerns because they can
be viewed out of context.160 But if a video is edited to remove
context and imply a false assertion of fact, it could be found to
be libelous and thus outside of the First Amendment’s protection.161 Likewise, courts have found that anti-harassment
statutes that target the harasser’s non-expressive conduct instead of speech are permissible under the First Amendment.162
And if the act of recording is so offensive that it would cause the
subject to fight the videographer, then it may be prohibited
under the Court’s fighting words doctrine.163 Thus, the harm
to privacy itself that the right to record presents is not enough
to remove it from First Amendment protection.
Some may still argue that the value of permitting recording
should nevertheless be weighed against the residual privacy
concerns. Daniel J. Solove argues that a liberal free speech
regime does not justify allowing individuals to invade each
other’s privacy because privacy rights are derived from the
same interests in autonomy as free speech rights.164 Thus, he
argues that the law should take a balancing approach when the
two rights are in conflict.165 Initially, however, it should be
noted that the liberal notion of protecting an individual’s autonomy is rooted in the individual’s ability to consent to governof privacy, whether in a public or private place”). See generally Lum, supra note
155, at 395–404 (surveying federal and state anti-voyeurism laws). But the language in these statutes must still be narrow enough to cover only those situations
in which the victim has a reasonable expectation of privacy. See Ex parte Thompson, 442 S.W.3d 325, 348–49 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014) (holding catchall provision
in state’s anti-voyeurism statute was unconstitutionally overbroad because it
criminalized recordings that did not invade “substantial privacy interests.”).
160
Lipton, supra note 153, at 928.
161
See Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 347 (1974) (holding that
First Amendment only requires some finding of fault for imposing liability for
libeling a private citizen).
162
See, e.g., Gormley v. Conn. State Dep’t of Prisons, 632 F.2d 938, 941–42
(2d Cir. 1980) (upholding a Connecticut statute criminalizing harassing phone
calls); United States v. Lampley, 573 F.2d 783, 787 (3d Cir. 1978) (upholding a
federal statute criminalizing harassing phone calls).
163
See Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 573 (1942).
164
See Daniel J. Solove, The Virtues of Knowing Less: Justifying Privacy Protections Against Disclosure, 53 DUKE L.J. 967, 992 (2003) (“If the interest of the
speaker or listener is defined in terms of self-determination and autonomy, the
interest of the harmed individual can be conceptualized in similar terms . . . .
There is no clear reason why the autonomy of speakers or listeners should prevail
over that of the harmed individuals.”).
165
See id. at 1031.
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ment rule and therefore places no duty on the government to
protect citizens from harm to their autonomy caused by a private actor.166 But an autonomous actor can of course consent
to government restrictions on speech to shield the actor from
some harm unrelated to the ideas the speech expresses, which
arguably includes an invasion of the actor’s privacy by a private
individual. Thus, the gravity of the harm threatened by the
invasion of privacy is indeed relevant because it allows an autonomous individual to consent to the restriction on speech
without sacrificing autonomy. But if this harm is not present,
then an autonomous individual cannot consent to the restriction on speech regardless of the importance of the speech.
Thus, the question is not a matter of balancing one interest
against the other, it is merely a matter of inquiring whether the
harm threatened by the invasion of privacy is sufficient to justify restriction on any speech. For the reasons discussed in
this section, the right to record satisfies these conditions.
CONCLUSION
This Note set forth a framework under which the right to
record can be explored further. One general question for further scholarship that this analysis leaves open is under what
exact circumstances the recording subject’s privacy rights are
sufficient to overcome First Amendment scrutiny. Although
this Note broadly concludes that the First Amendment does not
protect recording a subject who has a reasonable expectation of
privacy, further analysis is needed to properly define what a
reasonable expectation of privacy entails.167 In a general
sense, the question remains of whether a reasonable expectation of privacy entails a reasonable expectation that the subject
166
Cf. Scanlon, supra note 109, at 215 (“[T]he powers of a state are limited to
those that citizens could recognize while still regarding themselves as equal, autonomous, rational agents.”). See generally supra subpart II.A (exploring the
liberal theory of free speech).
167
For present purposes, it should be noted that a reasonable expectation of
privacy should include certain situations in which the subject is in a public place.
See Kaminski, supra note 141, at 1125–26 (criticizing the law’s frequent conception of privacy as a dichotomy between public and private realms). In addition to
the reasonable expectation of privacy people in public have underneath their
clothes discussed above, see supra notes 156–159 and accompanying text, courts
have found that “overzealous” private investigators’ actions can rise to the level of
an invasion-of-privacy tort when they use “intrusive” means “to elicit information
which would not be available through normal inquiry or observation.” Nader v.
Gen. Motor Corp., 255 N.E.2d 765, 769, 771 (1970) (holding plaintiff had sufficiently pled an invasion of privacy tort by alleging investigators followed plaintiff
so closely into a bank that they could “see the denomination of the bills he was
withdrawing”).
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will not be seen or overheard, or whether it entails a reasonable
expectation the subject will not be recorded. A more specific
question in this area is whether a subject can ever have a
reasonable expectation of privacy when the videographer is
openly recording. And relatedly, further analysis could explore
whether people have a per se reasonable expectation of privacy
from surreptitious recording.168
But even within this framework of the right to record,
courts and legislators should keep the right to record in mind
when addressing privacy protections. Of most immediate concern are wiretapping laws, like the one addressed in the Introduction.169 Many current wiretapping statutes are written
narrowly enough that they already provide a basis for courts to
exclude communications by individuals who do not have a reasonable expectation of privacy. The Federal Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1968, for example, criminalizes the
intentional interception of “oral” communication, but requires
both a subjective and objective expectation of privacy by defining “oral communication” as “any oral communication uttered
by a person exhibiting an expectation that such communication is not subject to interception under circumstances justifying such expectation.”170 Federal courts have liberally
interpreted this provision, holding, for example, that persons
on a trading floor171 and in a private “house of complete strangers”172 have no reasonable expectation of privacy. State
courts interpreting statutes with similar language should likewise interpret it liberally to respect the First Amendment’s right
168
Indeed, the ACLU recently filed a lawsuit in Massachusetts seeking to
explicitly extend Glik to cover the surreptitious recording of police officers. See
ACLU Lawsuit Defends Right to Record Police in Public Performance of Duties,
ACLU (July 1, 2016), https://www.aclu.org/news/aclu-lawsuit-defends-right-record-police-public-performance-duties [https://perma.cc/X3D8-DCC7].
169
See supra notes 7–8 and accompanying text.
170
18 U.S.C §§ 2510(2), 2511(1) (2012); see also, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE
§ 632(c) (West 2016) (excluding “any other circumstance in which the parties to
the communication may reasonably expect that the communication may be overheard or recorded” from eavesdropping prohibition); MO. REV. STAT. § 542.400(8)
(2015) (defining “oral communication” in a wiretapping statute as requiring a
justified expectation “that such communication is not subject to interception”).
But see, e.g., MICH. COMP. LAWS § 750.539c (2016) (forbidding any recording of a
private conversation without the consent of all parties involved); OR. REV. STAT.
§ 165.540 (2015) (prohibiting nonconsensual recording of private conversations
with some exceptions, namely for those involving law enforcement or taking place
at certain public events).
171
See In re John Doe Trader Number One, 894 F.2d 240, 243 (7th Cir. 1990)
(holding no reasonable expectation of privacy because “it has long been established that a police officer may enter private premises on a ruse or by deception”).
172
United States v. Pui Kan Lam, 438 F.2d 1202, 1206 (2d Cir. 1973).
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to record. Of potential future concern, courts and legislators
should be wary of expanding invasion of privacy torts.173 Such
expansions are still possible as long as the plaintiff’s reasonable expectation of privacy is included as a strict element.
In conclusion, this analysis reserves the normative question of whether a liberal right to gather information (including
nonconsensual recording) is desirable. A democratic right to
gather information would be more sensitive to private citizens’
privacy interests, while ensuring that information of public import is available for public debate. Nevertheless, the Supreme
Court has repeatedly rejected this view. Those concerned with
the implications of a liberal right to gather information should
focus their efforts on reversing this trend. But barring a
change in direction, a right to record private citizens in public
must inherently accompany any right to record police officers
in public.

173
For a discussion of proposals to do so, see supra note 155 and accompanying text.

R

\\jciprod01\productn\C\CRN\102-3\CRN305.txt

820

unknown

Seq: 38

CORNELL LAW REVIEW

28-MAR-17

10:09

[Vol. 102:783

